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Abstract    
Based on observation in the District of  Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia 
shariatization was a form of  local re-packaging sharia where the term ‘sharia’ 
has been replaced with ‘Akhlaq al-Karimah’ (noble character). It then had 
the effect of  not only silencing critical groups but also moderating sharia to 
become more open and inclusive. More importantly, the local-branded sharia 
became a common ground for the various Islamist groups to coalesce and, indeed, 
suppress vigilante action to renounce violent threat, at the very least, and served 
to lessen the divides between them. In this regard, the so-called sharia was like 
‘killing two birds with one stone’ that on one side was a form of  moderation 
to the critical groups but, on the other, was designed to be a common ground 
for various Islamist groups to coalesce. 
[Berdasarkan penelitian di Kabupaten Cianjur, Jawa Barat, shariatisasi di 
Indonesia telah mengambil bentuk lokal dengan mengganti istilah ‘shariah’ 
dengan ‘akhlaq al-karimah’. Hal ini tidak hanya membungkam kelompok 
kritis, tetapi juga memoderasi syariah menjadi lebih terbuka dan inklusif. 
Terpenting adalah lokalisasi syariah menjadi landasan bersama bagi berbagai 
kelompok Islam untuk berkoalisi, dan alih – alih menekan aksi massa yang 
bisa menimbulkan kekerasan, dan yang menimbulkan perpecahan diantara 
1 First draft of  this paper was presented at International Conference on Growing 
Religious Intolerance in Indonesia: Outlook, Challenges, and Future Trajectory of  Indonesian Religious 
Life organized by Rajaratnam School of  International Studies (RSIS), Singapore and 
Pascasarjana UIN Sunan Kalijaga, in Yogyakarta on 24-25 September 2015.
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mereka. Dalam hal ini, perumpamaannya seperti ‘sekali lempar, dua burung 
terjatuh’, yang mana satu sisi merupakan bentuk moderasi kelompok kritis, 
satu sisi yang lain menjadi pondasi bersama koalisi berbagai kelompok Islam.]
Keywords:  shariatization, localizing, moderation, coalesce 
A. Introduction 
Following the downfall of  Suharto in Mei 1998, Indonesian 
society had rapidly developed social and political structures supportive 
of  the process of  democratization. It, in turn, provided unprecedented 
ground for Islamists to push for sharia law to take place. It was reflected 
in somewhere between 78 and 168 regulations across not less than 52 
districts and municipalities enacted between 1999 to 2009.2 Actually, the 
increase in shariatization amidst democratization was not only happened 
in Indonesia but was also the case in many other Muslim majority 
countries experiencing democratization such as Pakistan in 1960s, 
Afghanistan and Egypt in 1970s, Turkey in 1980s, Central Asia in early 
1990s, and Nigeria and Yemen in late 1990s.3 In this regard, shariatization 
is viewed as a direct product of  the process of  democratization.4 It was 
not necessarily indicating incompatibility of  Islam with democratization 
neither reflecting the low quality of  democracy as argued by Bush5 and 
Buehler.6 In fact, amidst the growth of  sharia regulation Indonesian 
democracy has still simultaneously developed and indeed been globally 
praised as an astonishing success and even seen as a “miracle.” Since 2006 
2 Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or 
Symptom?”, in Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, ed. by Greg Fealy 
and Sally White (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2008), pp. 
174–91; Michael Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing 
‘Shari’a’ Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces”, Comparative Politics, vol. 46, no. 1 (2013), 
pp. 63–82.
3 Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties”.
4 Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of  Law in Modern 
Indonesia (Honolulu: University of  Hawaii Press, 2008), p. 2; Nadirsyah Hosen, Shari’a 
and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS), 2007).
5 Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”
6 Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties”.
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to 2013 Indonesia had still been the only country considered “free” in 
Southeast Asia.7 
The persistence of  development of  democracy along with the 
growth of  shariatization would seem, then, to put into question a 
number of  dominant contemporary discourses on their incompatibility.8 
To examine the co-existence of  shariatization and democratization, the 
author did in-depth qualitative fieldwork research in the District of  Cianjur 
West Java, Indonesia. Cianjur was chosen as it represented a ‘hard’ or 
‘critical’ case study concerning the interrelationships between democracy 
and shariatization in favour of  four reasons. First, Cianjur regarded as a 
front-line of  initiation of  sharia-oriented regulations at the local level in 
Indonesia post-Suharto. Second, Cianjur was known as a head-quarter 
of  Gerakan Reformis Islam (GARIS—Gerakan Reformis Islam), which 
was a notable Islamist vigilante group.9 Third, historically Cianjur was one 
of  the primary bases for a revolutionary movement of  the Darul Islam 
(DI) and an Islamist party of  Masyumi in the 1950s-60s. Finally, Cianjur 
is known as a City of  Pious Muslims (Kota Santri) with about 99 percent 
Muslim population of  the total two million inhabitants. I interviewed 59 
informants from  different social groups representing former Executive 
Head and former Vice of  Executive Head, 11 government officers, 9 
leaders of  religious mass organizations, 5 Heads of  Villages, 4 semi-state 
organizations, 4 Islam-associated parties, 3 national-secular parties, 3 
Pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), 3 youth organizations, 3 vigilantes 
groups, 2 local academicians, 4 Catholic adherents, 3 Protestants, and 
one for each Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.
This paper argues that the Islamists might shift from one form 
7 Freedom House, “Indonesia”, Freedom in the World (2013), https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/indonesia, accessed 22 Oct 2013.
8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (Norman: University of  Oklahoma Press, 1991); Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash of  Civilizations and the Remaking of  World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); 
Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of  Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (London: Phoenix, 2004); 
Francis Fukuyama, The End of  History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); 
Francis Fukuyama, “The west has won”, The Guardian (11 Oct 2001), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/11/afghanistan.terrorism30, accessed 31 Mar 2014.
9 Ismail Hasani (ed.), Radikalisme Agama di Jabodetabek & Jawa Barat: Implikasinya 
terhadap Jaminan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan (Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2010).
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of  interpretation and application of  sharia to the other following the 
changing in social and political contexts. The knowledge and practice 
of  shariatization have multiple sociological dimensions that linked 
together knowledge reproduction over the ‘sacred’ texts — Quran, 
Hadith, and jurisprudence — and social practices of  the ‘profane’ 
world of  the ‘present’ days that linked to the ‘past’ and oriented to the 
‘future’.10 Thus, the interpretation and application of  sharia were not 
fixed and permanent, neither it has closed meaning. Within this frame, 
the Islamists might repackage the symbolism of  sharia into a locally 
acceptable term of  Akhlaq al-Karimah (noble character). On one side, 
it had the effect of  silencing critical groups by moderating sharia to 
become more open and inclusive. In the other side, it has provided a 
common ground for the various Islamist groups to coalesce and served 
to lessen the divides between them. Thus, the arguments proposed in 
this paper have enriched the existent researches that view the growth 
of  shariatization post-Suharto as a manifestation of  multiple forms of  
dissonance,11 ideological continuation of  the Darul Islam (DI) and the 
Masyumi of  the 1950s,12 recalling the Jakarta Charter of  194513, and by-
product of  democratization post Suharto.14
First of  all, the paper will discuss the social and political context of  
the District of  Cianjur. Then, it will elaborate the process of  negotiated 
sharia at the local level where the term ‘sharia’ has been adjusted to the 
locally familiar term of  ‘Akhlaq al-Karimah’ or noble character. The 
last part will present sociological explanation on the process of  making 
sharia palatable as well as its impact on social formation in Cianjur in 
10 Talal Asad, The Idea of  an Anthropology of  Islam (Washington D.C: Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986).
11 Salim, Challenging the Secular State.
12 Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”
13 Robert W. Hefner, “Shari‘a Politics and Indonesian Democracy”, The Review 
of  Faith & International Affairs, vol. 10, no. 4 (2012), pp. 61–9.
14 Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties”; Michael 
Buehler, “Whodunit? Politicians Affiliated with Secular Parties implement most Sharia 
Regulations”, TEMPO, vol. Special Edition 10 Years of  Sharia (2011); Bernhard 
Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy (Singapore: Institute of  
Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2009); Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: 
Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2010).
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post-Suharto. 
B. Negotiating the Sharia 
The fieldwork research has found that interpretation over the 
so-called sharia, and shariatization, was not a fixed and permanent but 
was somewhat open and, indeed, negotiable that fluctuated in line with 
specific social and political contexts. It is not to suggest that sharia has 
lost its connection with the ‘grand’ texts — Qur’an, Hadith, and Islamic 
jurisprudence — and the traditions of  Islam, but that these connections 
were subject to multiple reinterpretations. In this regard, shariatization 
was remarkably adaptive and accommodative, or, more precisely, it was a 
form of  symbolic and political adjustment to the National Constitution 
of  Indonesia, which is non-theological.15 Cianjur’s shariatization was thus 
a moderate form of  shariatization that was developed in response to 
heightened suspicions and resistance from the local, national, and global 
critics of  what they saw as the Islamisation of  Indonesia. 
The foremost evidence pertaining to the adaptive and flexible 
nature of  Cianjur shariatization was a shift from the use of  the term 
‘sharia’ to ‘Akhlaq al-Karimah’ or noble character. Thus, Cianjur Islamists 
shifted from the movement of  ‘sharia enforcement’ to the Movement 
of  Noble Character Development or the so-called Gerbang Marhamah 
(Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlaq Al-Karimah). The Gerbang 
Marhamah had two policies. The first was related to the enactment of  
the ‘noble character’ movement within government apparatuses, as well 
as for the people of  Cianjur in general. Regarding the apparatuses, the 
policy consisted of  four Executive Head’s Orders. First, it was to require 
inhabitation of  congregational prayers, especially the Dzuhur (mid-day 
prayer). Second, it was to encourage the apparatuses to pay for alms 
(zakat) and donation (Infaq and Ṣadaqah) on earned income. Third, it 
was to intensify religious preaching at government department units, 
and, fourth, it was to call out to the apparatuses to promote a ‘respectful 
15 LPPI and MUI Cianjur, Apa dan Bagaimana Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di 
Kabupaten Cianjur: Bahan Penyuluhan dan Sosialisasi bagi para petugas Akhlaqul Karimah (PAK) 
di Kabupaten Cianjur (Cianjur: LPPI, 2002); LPPI, Format Dasar Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam 
di Kabupaten Cianjur (Cianjur: LPPI, 2001); LPPI, Gerbang Marhamah Gerakan Pembangunan 
Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah Kabupaten Cianjur: Rencana strategis mewujudkan masyarakat 
Cianjur sugih mukti yang Islami (Cianjur: LPPI, 2002).
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pattern of  conduct’ (Uswah al-Hasanah) to generate an Islamic social 
environment. The goals of  Gerbang Marhamah were to develop noble 
character individuals and tranquil families as well as clean and capable 
government apparatuses. The combination of  those achievements was 
expected to create a prosperous and peaceful Cianjur or the so-called 
baldatun thoyyibatun wa rabbun ghaafur (a prosperous country with the 
blessing of  God).16 
Why did Cianjur’s Islamists shift from using the term ‘sharia’ to that 
of  the Akhlaq al-Karimah? First, although Islam is the majority religion 
and religious life is salient, political Islam and Islamism in particular, have 
not been as strong as Muslim culture in Cianjur. Cianjur is known as a 
City of  Pious Muslims (Kota Santri) rooted to the 17th century when the 
first generation of  Ulama (Islamic Scholars) introduced Islam, and since 
then Cianjur has been a centrum of  Islamic teaching for the people in the 
surrounding areas. Currently, Cianjur has about 663 Pesantren (Islamic 
boarding schools), more than 4.000 parochial Islamic teachings (Majelis 
Ta’lim), 4.462 mosques, and 13.850 prayer premises (Musholla). Muslims 
constitute about 99 percent of  the total two million inhabitants. In the 
year 2005, non-Muslims shared ‘only’ about 0.77 percent, which included 
Protestants of  6.693 people, Catholics of  3.592 people, Hindus of  2.109 
people, Buddhists of  2.463 people, and others of  154 people.17 Despite 
the strong social, historical, and cultural tied to Islam, Islamist politics 
was much less influential in Cianjur since the independence of  Indonesia 
in 1945. Although Cianjur had notorious Ulama who led the fighting 
against colonialism, none of  those Islamist figures became involved in 
the government or served as top range bureaucrats in the early period 
of  independence Indonesia. At that time, there were 17 districts in the 
West Java region, but none of  the Ulama gained a position of  Head 
of  District. Those positions were all served by the proponents of  the 
Indonesian National Party (PNI-Partai Nasional Indonesia). Indeed, in 
16 LPPI and MUI Cianjur, Apa dan Bagaimana Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di 
Kabupaten Cianjur: Bahan Penyuluhan dan Sosialisasi bagi para petugas Akhlaqul Karimah (PAK) 
di Kabupaten Cianjur, p. 9; LPPI, Gerbang Marhamah Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat 
Berakhlakul Karimah Kabupaten Cianjur: Rencana strategis mewujudkan masyarakat Cianjur 
sugih mukti yang Islami; LPPI, Format Dasar Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur.
17 LPPI, Gerbang Marhamah Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah 
Kabupaten Cianjur: Rencana strategis mewujudkan masyarakat Cianjur sugih mukti yang Islami.
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the first election of  1955, the Cianjur’s Masyumi obtained fewer votes 
than the PNI. The story was even worse in the following decades when 
Islamist parties lost significant numbers of  constituents. In the post-
Suharto era of  1998, the Islamist parties were even outside of  the big 
three list parties in Cianjur. 
Unconsolidated political Islamism in Cianjur was also underpinned 
by the fact that its Muslims were affiliated to widely diverse social 
organizations. Although Cianjur’s cultural religiosity was predominantly 
NU, this was not reflected in the registered members or the formal 
branches of  the organization of  the NU. The people of  Cianjur had 
strong attachments to the culture of  NU, much stronger than to its 
organizations. Concerning registered members and branches, the NU 
was not even more prominent than the United Islam (PERSIS-Persatuan 
Islam) and Muhammadiyah—the supposedly smaller Islam-based 
associations. The PERSIS and Muhammadiyah controlled more notorious 
headquarters and schools than the NU in the Town of  Cianjur. In politics, 
the National Awakening Party (PKB—Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) the 
United Development Party (PPP—Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), 
which were associated with the NU, had underperformed in the elections 
of  1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014. In other words, people identified 
themselves as (culturally) NU, without submitting to the organization and 
formal structure of  the NU, or being linked to its affiliated political parties.
The configuration of  Islamist groups in Cianjur was more 
complicated in the Reformasi era than before it. Before 1998, especially 
in the last decade of  the Suharto regime, there was only one single 
group of  identifiable Islamists, namely those who kept a distance from 
the Regime and were left outside of  formal politics but did not show 
any overt resistance to Suharto. However, in the aftermath of  the 
Reformasi, following the opening of  the ‘door of  freedom,’ Cianjur’s 
Islamists emerged in three main types of  movements, namely the Islamist 
Pesantren, Islamist vigilantes, and Islamist parties.
The Islamist Pesantren were primarily concerned with the issue of  
traditional-religious values, culture, and morality. They worked to instigate 
this through various means, such as informal education and training, 
to deal with issues related to what they saw as the decline of  values, 
culture, and morality. The Islamist Pesantren consisted of  the associates 
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and social networks of  Ajengan—a Sundanese term for respectful and 
charismatic religious figures—and Santri, that were actively involved in 
movements to defend local values and morality which were supposedly 
rooted in Islamic teaching and values. It is important to note that the 
Pesantren were, however, a divergent group. The Islamist Pesantren 
that were excluded by Suharto’s regime tended to be more coercive 
and militant than other (ordinary) Pesantren who previously received 
budgetary allocation and accommodation from the government under 
Suharto. Thus, in my research, the use of  ‘Islamist Pesantren’ refers 
to the coercive and militant Pesantren who were actively involved in 
the promotion of  sharia enforcement and particularly against vice and 
immoral practices, but who were not using the violent types of  action 
adopted by the Islamist vigilantes. The Islamist Pesantren were very 
concerned with what they saw as decreasing local traditional values and 
culture that resulted from, on one side, the devastating economic crises, 
work dismissal, unemployment, and, on the other side, the overwhelming 
euphoria of  democracy as reflected, for instance, in the expansion of  
media and entertainment businesses. In dealing with these matters, 
the Islamist Pesantren took action, in cooperation with their existent 
networks, both within and without Islam-affiliated groups in Cianjur. 
As a result, they were able to expand informal Islamic education and 
religious training to the Cianjurians as well as employing peaceful means 
of  movement and rejecting violent actions.
The Islamist vigilantes were chiefly represented by the Reformist 
Movement of  Islam (GARIS—Gerakan Reformis Islam) that was 
employing different types of  political actions to the Islamist Pesantren and 
the Islamist parties. They had employed vigilante types of  violent threats 
in their actions. Thus, they used to patrol nightclubs, massage houses, 
karaoke bars, and vendors of  alcoholic drinks. They also conducted 
raids during Ramadhan, a month of  fasting for Muslims, targeting 
businesses and individuals who were deemed disrespectful to the holy 
month of  Ramadhan. The GARIS was established in 1999. At that time, 
the situation was colored by severe political and economic uncertainties. 
Indonesian governance, especially the police and courts, were weak and 
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lacked legitimacy and trust of  the people in enforcing the national law.18 
Here, therefore, the vigilantes acted to fill the gap in legal governance. 
Nonetheless, vigilante Islamists were most anxious and propelled by the 
threat of  socialism and communism that they saw as resurging amidst 
the moral vacuum of  the Reformasi. Indeed, this anxiety was the main 
reason for the establishment of  the GARIS.  
The GARIS was founded by Chep Hernawan, an Islamist politician 
of  the Crescent and Star Party (PBB—Partai Bulan Bintang), which 
affiliated to the Masyumi politics of  the mid 20th century of  Indonesia. 
Although the GARIS was established in 1999, it remained less known in 
public as Hernawan was busied in Jakarta serving as a treasurer of  the 
party. In 2001 when Hernawan saw the political prospect of  the PBB 
was less prospective to his political career and his dissatisfaction with 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra—a former President of  the PBB—he went back 
home to Cianjur and started to activate the GARIS as a local vigilantes 
organization.19 It coincided with growing tension of  local politics in 
Cianjur in early 2000s before the first executive head election in the 
post-Reformasi.20 Although GARIS was a local vigilante organization, 
it has a strong network with other national vigilante groups such as the 
Islamic Front Defenders (FPI—Front Pembela Islam) and the Forum 
of  Islam Adherents (FUI—Forum Umat Islam). The network was due 
to link owned by the Hernawan since he was in Jakarta and maintained a 
network to the national leaders of  the vigilantes based in Jakarta. Besides, 
the GARIS was also having similar issues of  concern to those vigilantes 
of  the FPI and FUI regarding anti-communism and anti-liberalism as well 
as moral degradation primarily amongst Muslim youth and communities.21 
The Islamist civilian vigilantes carried street demonstrations and 
extra-parliamentary movements frequently, through the means of  violent 
threat, in their attempt to enforce Islamic values and morality. The 
18 Michael Cookson et al., Anomie and Violence: Non-truth and Reconciliation in 
Indonesian Peacebuilding (Canberra: ANU Press, 2010).
19 Ratno Lukito, “Islamisation as Legal Intolerance: The Case of  GARIS in 
Cianjur, West Java”, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of  Islamic Studies, vol. 54, no. 2 (2016), pp. 393–425.
20 LPPI and MUI Cianjur, Apa dan Bagaimana Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di 
Kabupaten Cianjur: Bahan Penyuluhan dan Sosialisasi bagi para petugas Akhlaqul Karimah (PAK) 
di Kabupaten Cianjur; LPPI, Format Dasar Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur.
21 Lukito, “Islamisation as Legal Intolerance”.
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emergence of  Islamist civilian vigilantes was a typical phenomenon of  
the immediate period of  the Reformasi, whereas, in the past—before the 
Reformasi—the New Order regime severely burned and punished any 
vigilante type of  movement. Under Suharto’s New Order, such groups 
consequently kept a distance from the State and were mainly involved in 
Islamic foundations or privately established businesses. It enabled them 
to stay mostly independent from the State during the Suharto regime.
Scriptural interpretation of  Islamic texts had underpinned and 
accompanied the response of  Islamist vigilantes to the situations in the 
Reformasi era. For instance, their interpretation of  the Quran, 3:111  was 
to take decisive and assertive opprobrium for calling to the good and 
forbidding the evil. The Islamist vigilantes also had literal interpretations 
of  the Hadith of  “Whosoever of  you sees an evil action, let him change 
it with his hand; and if  he is not able to do so, then with his tongue; and 
if  he is not able to do so, then with his heart; and that is the weakest of  
faith.” The vigilante Islamists interpreted the ‘hand’ is physical actions, 
but the Islamist Pesantren and politicians had interpreted it as ‘a ruler or 
government authority’ illustrating, at the least, considerable variation in 
Islam and Islamism. Although scriptural understanding had underpinned 
a decisive form of  action among the Islamists, as indicated in the field, 
the vigilante type of  violent threats was not a permanent action. Rather, 
they could be changed into more ‘cooperative’ action that renounced 
violence once the social contexts were supportive of  Islamists’ expression 
and demands.
Unlike the Islamist Pesantren and the Islamist vigilantes that 
dealt mainly with social and cultural issues, the Islamist parties focused 
mainly on issues related to law and constitution. Since 1999 they had 
been mobilizing political movements to recall the Jakarta Charter into 
the National Constitution. The Charter consisted of  the sentence of  
“…the obligation for Muslims to adhere to sharia” that was previously 
part of  the first principle of  Indonesian State ideology of  Pancasila 
but removed by Sukarno and Hatta, the First President and Vice, on 18 
August 1945, a day after the proclamation of  Indonesian independence. 
The movement to recalling back the Charter was based on Islamists’ view 
that it was a fundamental foundation for sharia enforcement over the 
Muslims of  Indonesia. The Islamists were of  the belief  that only through 
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incorporating the Charter would the State have the stronger legitimacy to 
enforce religious morality and values.22 With this in mind, they expected 
that moral degradation and threats to traditional values would be part 
of  the State’s responsibility. In other words, Islamist politicians relied 
heavily on the State as a core instrument in dealing with multiple crises, 
especially related to the perception of  the decline of  local values and 
moral degradation in the period of  following Reformasi. Threats to 
traditional values and the culture of  religiosity, in the view of  Islamist 
politicians, were not only rooted in the incapacity of  the State’s institutions 
but also related to problems of  insufficient law and constitution, due to 
the removal of  the Jakarta Charter in 1945. The Islamist politicians thus 
saw an attempt to re-incorporate the Jakarta Charter into the National 
Constitution as an attempt to solve the problem of  law and constitution, 
to obligate Muslims to behave in accordance to sharia. Hence, the recalling 
of  the Jakarta Charter into Constitution was seen as strengthening State 
authority in dealing with religious values and morality. 
The expressions of  Islamist parties in Cianjur were different 
from those at the national level, even though the local parties were part 
of  those at the national level. For instance, the Cianjur PKB that was 
associated with the NU distinct to the profile of  their headquarters. The 
PKB headquarters was widely known as politically inclusive, whereby it 
had refused shariatization, including the proposal of  recalling the Jakarta 
Charter in the process of  amendment of  the National Constitution from 
1999 to 2002.23 Indeed, the national PKB was also one of  the parties that 
requested Indonesian President Yudhoyono (2004-2014) to revoke sharia-
related law.24 In contrast to its national profile, however, Cianjur’s PKB 
had been remarkably noticeable as the front-liners for shariatization in 
the post Reformasi era. It had worked along with the PBB and promoted 
Wasidi for the Head of  District in 2001 that had accordingly led to large-
scale shariatization enforcement in Cianjur. 
Cianjur’s politics were also unique regarding the PBB party. 
At the national level, the PBB had been unsuccessful in gaining a 
parliamentary seat in the 2009 election, following its failure to meet the 
22 Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia.
23 Ibid.
24 Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”
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National Parliamentary Threshold, which was 2.5 percent of  the total 
national votes, according to the Law Number 10 the Year 2008 article 
202. However, at the local-level in Cianjur, the situation was completely 
different, since the PBB had successfully gained three parliamentary seats, 
which had increased by one seat from the 2004 parliamentary election. 
The primary explanation for this was the strong identification with the 
Masyumi among local people of  Cianjur. Many descendants of  the NU, 
Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, and PUI were associated with the Masyumi. 
The inhabitation of  the Masyumi was persistently mobilised through 
the reproduction of  its ideology, history, and even notions of  kinship 
relationships. Family connections or schools owned by the Masyumi-
related foundation were the predominant channels through which the 
foundations mobilized the people of  Cianjur. 
Cianjur Islam-based parties were also not performing well in the 
elections, and they even got much fewer votes than their Nationalist 
counterparts in all four elections of  post-Suharto (1999, 2004, 2009, and 
2014). All Islamic-Islamist parties saw significant declines in popular votes 
from 39.7 percent in 1999 to 36.2 and 29.2 in 2004 and 2009 respectively, 
but then slightly increased to 30.3 percent in 2014. Out of  the five 
Islam-based parties, only the PKS had increased their share of  votes in 
the last four elections of  post-Suharto continuously. In comparison to 
the Nationalist parties, the total votes of  Islam-based parties were much 
fewer than the nationalist parties such as the Golkar, PDIP, and Demokrat 
Party in all four elections of  post-Suharto. 
In a situation of  unconsolidated Islamist politics as discussed 
above, there was strong pressure from a number of  opposing groups 
such as the nationalist party of  the Indonesian Democratic Party of  
Struggle (PDIP-Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) and the Legal 
Assistance Association (LBH-Lembaga Bantuan Hukum) as well as 
some religious minority groups. The national government in Jakarta 
was also resistant since shariatization was considered incompatible 
with the national principle of  Unity in Diversity (Bhineka Tunggal Ika). 
Additionally, challenges were also coming from international agencies. 
A number of  Western ambassadors in Jakarta visited Cianjur and met 
with the elected Executive Head, Wasidi Swastomo, as well as with the 
Ajengans at the Cianjur Ulama Council, to question the shariatization 
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agenda and express objections against it. There were fears that the 
development of  shariatization in Cianjur would be a threat to the national 
unity of  Indonesia and its religious and ethnic pluralism. Besides, it 
was anxiously considered discrimination over religious minority groups 
such as the Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists in Cianjur, and on the 
other side, it was also deemed as giving privilege to dominant groups 
of  Muslims especially regarding local budgets on various Islam-related 
programs. The issue of  discrimination of  shariatization movement over 
religious minority groups has also been noted by other researchers such 
as Abuza25 and Bush.26 Moreover, rejection toward shariatization was 
also rooted in perceptions that the proposed form of  sharia in Cianjur 
was an expression of  Arab Islam rather than Indonesian Islam. In the 
view of  critical groups, Indonesia is a pluralistic society and not Arabia 
where shariatization was associated with vicious punishments such as 
hand cutting, death-penalty, and stoning.
The above criticism and resistance toward shariatization had put 
pressure on Islamist groups, including Wasidi as a Head of  Cianjur 
Executive Office and Ajengan  Halim, a Chair of  Cianjur Ulama Council. 
In response to the criticism, the Islamists would thus have to find a local, 
and perhaps, diluted and more moderate formulation of  shariatization 
that would serve to dampen suspicion and resistance to it. The Islamists 
then agreed to repackage ‘sharia.’ Ajengan Halim explained.
I said “well, we need to change. Do not use the terms ‘sharia enforcement.’ 
Let’s put it this way, a person considered as having noble character 
means he/she is practicing Islamic sharia. How about if  we use Akhlaq 
al-Karimah instead of  Islamic sharia?” 
The replacing ‘sharia’ with ‘Akhlaq al-Karimah’ thus a form of  
Islamists response to criticism and resistance. Since then, the movement 
was no longer called as a ‘Sharia Enforcement’ but rather the Gerbang 
Marhamah, an abbreviation of  Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat 
Berakhlakul Karimah or the Movement of  Noble Society Development, 
making this re-packaged form of  sharia more palatable to critics and the 
25 Zachary Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (London: Routledge, 
2007), p. 84.
26 Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”, 
p. 175.
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diversity of  the local population. 
Within the Islamists’ framework, the shift was justifiable based 
on the Islamists’ interpretation that the ‘Akhlaq al-Karimah’ was no less 
critical than sharia in Islamic tradition. Here, the Islamists referred to the 
Hadith that “Verily I (Muhammad) was sent for none other than to perfect 
noble character” and were thus of  the belief  that Akhlaq al-Karimah was 
the primary objective of  the prophecy and the ultimate goal of  Islam.
C. ‘Killing Two Birds with One Stone’
  The locally repackaged sharia—the Gerbang Marhamah (GM)—
enabled diverse contesting groups—both the opponents and proponents 
of  the agenda of  shariatization to establish compromise and agreement 
to prevent hostility and reduce tensions affected by the dimension 
of  the ‘political’ in Cianjur. The ‘political’ here refers to a situation 
of  contestation among various Islamist groups as well as between the 
Islamists and the nationalists in Cianjur.  Each group held its interest and 
agenda, and this had generated tension and hostility during the process 
of  democratization in the District. Meanwhile, the ‘politics’ refers to 
maneuvers aimed to establish order and prevent hostility towards the 
‘political.’27 In other words, the GM was like ‘killing two birds with one 
stone’ that on one side was a form of  moderation to the critical groups 
but, on the other, was designed to be a common ground for various 
Islamist groups to coalesce. 
1. The Moderation
There were several arguments and strategic approaches that 
allowed moderation of  the GM. First of  all, there was the argument by 
the Islamists that the GM submitted to the superiority of  the national 
constitution over the people of  Indonesia, including the Cianjurians. The 
GM took a spirit of  submission to the National Constitution but, in the 
meantime, desired to revitalize local values, norms, and morality that 
were associated with Islam and embedded in the so-called Kota Santri 
(the City of  Pious Muslim) of  Cianjur. As Wasidi told;
The Gerbang Marhamah is designed to be compatible with democracy. It 
27 Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?”, Social 
Research, vol. 66, no. 3 (1999), pp. 745–58.
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is a strategy aimed at enabling people to conduct sharia while living in the 
district that submits to the State’s Law. It is because if  we are not flexible, 
sharia will never be applicable… I did not want to clash sharia with the 
Constitution. In the Constitution, we have assured freedom of  assembly 
and expression. I said to fellow Islamists “Don’t be too extreme. Let’s 
perceive we live in a country like America, the UK, or Europe where many 
are Muslims. They are neither bustling on the Constitution nor rebelling, 
but I am sure if  they did well, they would enter paradise in the hereafter. 
The question remains, however, as to why the critical groups 
accepted the arguments of  Wasidi that the GM was compatible with 
democracy and the national constitution. Also, moreover, why did 
the other Islamists—the so-called extreme groups as stated by Wasidi 
above—agree to adopt a modest form of  Islamism and to avoid an 
extreme approach to sharia enforcement? There are four possible answers 
to these questions. First, as has been discussed above, at that time there 
were heightened perceptions of  crises, primarily related to the situation 
of  lawlessness and mistrust of  government apparatus, due to previous 
practices under Suharto’s regime. Although the State apparatus itself  
brought the symbolism of  the GM but in a period where the people were 
suffering from the anomic situation, and its related heightened insecurity, 
following the fall of  the Suharto regime, the symbolism of  the GM 
was quickly embraced by people of  various groups as a response to the 
predicament of  the New Order’s overreaching economic development 
that had resulted in a number of  social discrepancies, impoverishment, 
cultural degradation, and social and political instability in the late 1990s. 
Within this situation, the GM brought a powerful imaginary symbolism, 
suggesting that everyone in the Cianjur “will live happily ever after”28 
under the GM and thereby provided an element of  security within an 
insecure situation.
Another explanation to the acceptance of  the GM was that the 
GM had been constructed as synonymous with the adat (local customs, 
social habits, or practice) that had been adapted with Islam since the early 
process of  the coming of  Islam in the region in the fourteenth century. 
The ‘nickname’ of  Cianjur as a Kota Santri has indicated that the adat and 
symbolism of  Islam have, for a long time, blended together. This local 
28  Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993), p. xiii.
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adat helped to aid non-Muslim groups to accept the GM.
Next, the GM had gone through a series of  consultations with 
various groups in Cianjur especially the religious minority groups. 
Through the process of  consultation, the minority and critical groups 
were also able to express their concerns, criticisms, and anxieties about 
the shariatization agenda in Cianjur. Initially, the minority religious groups 
of  Cianjur were opposing the Islamists’ plan on shariatization, but after 
series of  dialogues resulted in the shift from the usage of  the term of  
‘sharia’ to the ‘Akhlaq al-Karimah,’ they could accept the plan. In other 
words, the local ‘invention’ of  the GM had resulted in the process of  
dialogue and communication between various groups in Cianjur where 
they were able to influence its form and outcome. Although some 
opponent groups remained skeptical of  the ‘promise of  happiness’ of  
the GM, at the very least, they were becoming less suspicious of  it. For 
example, Ketut Ngetis, the representative of  the Cianjur Hindus, told me:
I and the other three [minority group religious leaders] were invited to 
the Cianjur Parliament to discuss the agenda of  Islamic sharia. I was 
questioning the objective of  the agenda and the clear understanding of  the 
proposed sharia. Some [of  the Parliament members] said that the agenda 
was intended to restore the Akhlak by religious teachings. I replied, “if  so, 
everyone has his or her own sharia according to his/her religion.” Several 
other discussions followed the meeting [in the Parliament]. Finally, the 
sharia movement becomes the Gerbang Marhamah, and thus the sharia 
was withdrawn. So, we could accept it.  
The third explanation was that the shift from the usage of  the term 
of  ‘sharia’ to the GM had convinced the critical groups about the main 
objective of  the GM, namely to deal with the perceived deterioration and 
crises in Cianjur following the Reformasi. In this regard, the GM was no 
longer seen as a threat to national ideology and constitution but, rather, it 
was an instrument of  dealing with the matters of  local values, traditions, 
and cultures. Ms. Musiyem, a Catholic adherent, told me that she did not 
see a problem and, indeed, had not experienced discrimination due to the 
agenda of  the GM. In Musiyem’s view, the so-called sharia agenda within 
the GM was an attempt by the Cianjur people, a Muslim majority, to deal 
with various issues and concerns that were widely shared by most other 
religious groups in Cianjur. In other words, the prominence of  Islam, 
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and sharia, in particular, was mainly because the majority of  people were 
Muslims with strong an identity of  Islam, as reflected in their association 
with a Kota Santri. With this in mind, it thus is evident that the people 
referred to Islam and sharia (Islamic law) as a source of  reference in 
dealing with their various concerns. As Ms. Musiyem told me:
Here in West Java, about 90 percent are Muslims. So, because Muslims are 
the majority, perhaps they promote the GM to develop a better society. I 
never felt being discriminated for the faith that I belong to [Catholicism]. 
Everything is dependent on our self, how do we behave. If  we do well 
with others, we will have a good relationship with others.
My interview with Musiyem revealed that she and her family 
members were relatively secure regarding career position, and thus 
economic income. She and her husband worked as State Civil Servants 
and were able to be promoted to the expected career position, and their 
daughters were all already employed. Ms. Musiyem said.
About a career in bureaucracy, if  we are qualified, we will be promoted. 
I have been twice offered for career promotion to be a Head of  School. 
But I do not want to. There is no a constraint [of  promotion] due to 
my religion. If  in the last four years I was not promoted to be a Head 
of  School, it was not because of  religion, but rather my daughters did 
not allow me to serve as a Head of  School. My daughters are all already 
employed. My husband, for instance, although he is a Christian he can 
be promoted as a School Observer (Pengawas Sekolah) [a bureaucratic 
position higher than Head of  School].
Although Musiyem did not feel discriminated against because of  
religious faith, she then decided to wear a head veil.
There was no pressure on me [to wear a head veil], neither in my workplace 
nor my social community. I have been wearing a head veil in the last five 
years, and I do not feel under pressure [to do so]. There was a policy that 
non-Muslims were not required to wear a head veil, but I just wanted to 
wear it and am familiar with head veiled [Muslim] women as my [extended] 
family consisted of  diverse religions [where Musiyem has been familiar 
with head veil-women].
It is, of  course, very unusual in religious practices in Indonesia 
that non-Muslim women wear head veils. Ms. Musiyem’s decision to 
wear a head veil may have indicated a personal adjustment to ‘indirect’ 
18 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2018 M/1439 H
Hakimul Ikhwan
communal pressure where she would feel more comfortable wearing head 
veils amidst her activities among the majority of  head veiled women in 
the workplace. Although she said that there was no pressure upon her 
to wear a head veil when I further asked her feelings after wearing it, 
she admitted being more comfortable with head veils. She said “I feel 
comfortable. Before I wear it, when there was a meeting, among dozens 
of  people, only a few were not wearing head veil. So, I felt like becoming 
a point of  attention [by others/the majority].” Musiyem’s experience of  
wearing a Muslim Women’s-like head veil can also be seen as merely that 
people are social animals and have a strong desire to conform to those 
around them. Besides, the fact that Musiyem had grown up in a “Pancasila 
Family”—the term often used in Indonesia to denote a family, mostly 
an extended family, where the members belonged to different religious 
beliefs29—had enabled her to develop a personal capacity to adjust 
herself  to the wearing of  a head veil as some of  her family members 
were Muslims and wearing a head veil. 
Considering those combinations of  social forces and events, the 
GM thus gained acceptance from the minority religious groups. Indeed, 
the symbolism of  the GM was such that it then actually became regarded 
as belonging to the teaching of  all religions. Take, for example, the words 
of  Ketut Ngetis, the central figure of  Cianjur Hinduism: 
Initially, they [the Islamists] wanted Islamic sharia but then changed 
to Akhlaq al-Karimah. The terms of  Akhlaq al-Karimah are not strict 
sharia, but instead commonly used terms [in Cianjur] and acceptable [by 
people of  other religions]. [The acceptance is because] All religions are 
promoting Akhlaq al-Karimah. The terms are just adopted merely from 
Arabic, which means thoughtfulness, politeness, and morality. So, we 
could accept [the Akhlaq al-Karimah].
The nationalist party of  PDIP also finally approved the GM, 
although it was conditional on the extent to which the GM would ensure 
religious tolerance and respect. In this regard, acceptance of  the GM 
was not just based on its symbolism, but it was also dependent on how 
it would be practiced. As Buldan, a member of  the Cianjur Parliament 
of  the PDIP, stated, “finally, we approved the Gerbang Marhamah, but 
29 See Suhadi, “I Come from a Pancasila Family”: A Discursive Study on Muslim-
Christian Identity Transformation in Indonesian Post-Reformasi Era (Zürich: LIT Verlag, 2014).
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it was conditional to the assurance of  religious tolerance and respect.” 
Furthermore, the moderation of  the GM also acted to 
accommodate the will of  the many groups that made up the Cianjur 
Islamists, most of  whom wanted the straightforward implementation of  
Sharia. In this regard, the usage of  the term ‘Akhlaq al-Karimah,’ which 
is in Arabic and associated with Islamist symbolism, was intended to 
placate Islamists who wanted straightforward sharia. It was because the 
term ‘Akhlaq al-Karimah was considered as representing the core spirit 
of  Sharia according to the Hadith mentioned above. It was Wasidi’s view: 
The initial concept was Islamic Sharia, but it was then repackaged with 
Akhlaq al-Karimah [noble character]. Some Islamists were asking me, 
“why don’t we use [the terms of] Islamic Sharia?” I replied, “this is Islamic 
Sharia.” It is to bridge those who want straightforward Sharia [and the 
critical groups]. 
The GM, however, was not merely of  interest of  Islamists but also 
the nationalist. It had acted as a symbolic nodal point that enabled both 
Islamists and nationalists to share their interests. For the Islamists, the 
enforcement of  zakat, for instance, had a pragmatic-strategic orientation 
that helped to maintain their political existence in Cianjur, besides their 
transcendental orientation to behave in accordance to sharia. Meanwhile, 
in the view of  the nationalist politicians, the enforcement of  zakat 
helped to shore up power via religious channels with the Ulama as well 
as to increase  popularity and electability in the election. Nationalists-
secularists’ interests in the shariatization reflected in the fact that eight 
out of  34 provinces adopted sharia law between 1999 and 2009 were 
dominated by the nationalist-secularist parties. In those provinces, the 
secular party of  the Golkar and the PDIP won either through winning 
the majority of  votes or through a plurality of  votes, whereas the Islamist 
Party of  PPP gathered a plurality of  votes in one province, namely the 
Aceh Province. Here, the term of  ‘plurality of  votes’ refers to a coalition 
of  multi-parties whereas the term ‘majority’ refers to a single dominant 
party’s vote.30 Research by Bush31 on the Districts of  Bulukumba, Maros, 
and Dompu found that the symbolism of  shariatization was employed 
30 Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties”, pp. 63–82.
31 Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”, 
pp. 174–91.
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by an Executive Head, who found to be or suspected of  corruption, as 
camouflage to distract public attention away from ongoing and pervasive 
corruption. Hefner32 also argued that the enactment of  sharia laws had 
practical and pragmatic reasons to provide lucrative ‘protection’ services 
for local businesses and neighborhoods. In other words, the mobilization 
of  sharia-related symbolism did not necessarily relate to promoting 
Islamic piety and law. It is worth to notice, however, that the shariatization 
of  policy was not always positive and contributive for the development 
of  Muslim community as it was the case in the Aceh Province. Initially, 
the shariatization was intended to re-invent the (prerogative) authority 
of  Ulama especially in rural areas or the so-called ‘Dayah.’ Instead, the 
development of  shariatization had indeed facilitated a decline in ulama 
authority because codification of  sharia became mostly the work of  the 
legislatures and executive officers.33
Moreover, secularists’ support for Islamization including sharia-
inspired policy was not a typical phenomenon of  the post-Suharto era. 
During the Suharto era, especially from the late 1980s to 1990s, Suharto 
had enacted policies that allowed the establishment of  the Sharia-based 
Bank Mu’amalat. Suharto also allowed Muslim schoolgirls to wear Muslim 
dress in schools. Moreover, a decade before this, the Suharto regime had 
also introduced an Islamic law of  marriage 34. Those policies, however, 
were not intended merely to support Islamization but rather to strengthen 
the political legitimacy of  the regime, at least in the eyes of  Muslims, 
particularly the Ulama. 
Contrary to Bush35 and Buehler36 who argued local-sharia ordinance 
has curtailed the democratic freedom of  citizens, this paper sees it might 
have a substantial contributory element to the development of  democracy 
32 Hefner, “Shari‘a Politics and Indonesian Democracy”, pp. 61–9.
33 Salim, Challenging the Secular State.
34 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Robert W. Hefner, “Religion: Evolving 
Pluralism”, in Indonesia beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, ed. by Donald K. 
Emmerson (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); ʻAbd Allāh Aḥmad Naʻīm, Islam and 
the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of  Shariʻa (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2008).
35 Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”
36 Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties”.
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in the sense that the dynamic over shariatization has brought different 
and indeed conflicting views to the table in a constitutional way. Situating 
shariatization of  policy in binary opposition to democracy has been 
problematic, not only because each case of  shariatization represented 
specific local actors’ formation and structures, but also, as has been 
discussed above, there was no single motivation behind the promotion 
of  sharia amidst the processes of  democratization. It was not only driven 
by piety orientation but also by interests related to economy, politics, 
and culture. Indeed, the contents of  sharia-inspired regulations were not 
specifically Islamic, and thus the enforcement of  those regulations was 
not based on Islamic criminal law such as the hudud penalties for theft, 
robbery, adultery, or other ‘crimes against God.’37
The above discussion shows that the GM had been a form of  
moderation of  Sharia to the critical groups—the religious minority, 
nationalist parties, and the Legal Assistance Association—as well as to the 
Islamists who wanted straightforward Sharia. It was constructed as a form 
of  submission to the national constitution of  Indonesia. Moreover, it had 
also created an imaginary symbolism amidst the continued perception 
of  anomie, where the GM would bring the people to “live happily ever 
after.” The imaginary symbolism successfully gained acceptance through 
various hegemonic processes at both societal and state levels. At the 
societal level, the Islam-based groups in Cianjur were mainly socializing 
the GM to the people. Meanwhile, at the State level, more precisely the 
local government, the Executive Office employed its legitimate authority 
in the so-called ‘forum of  socialization’ to gain a ‘consent’ by the people 
or, at the very least, lessen resistance from them.  
2. The Coalescence
The GM had also functioned as a common ground of  coalescence 
among various Islamists and Islam-based groups in Cianjur. It is 
important to note that despite the above Islamism-oriented programs, 
the coalescence of  various Islamist groups was not immediately achieved, 
but it instead took place over time through a series of  social processes. 
In the first place, there was still doubt among some Islamist politicians 
whether to support the GM or not. It was mainly because, in their view, 
37 Hefner, “Shari‘a Politics and Indonesian Democracy”.
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the various programs of  the GM were considered as merely ceremonial 
and superficial. The programs were seen to lack substantive meaning and 
therefore would not have an eminent impact on the people. Dadan, the 
former MP and President of  Cianjur’s PKS, explained this: 
I think the GM did not change anything. The atmosphere [created by the 
GM] was merely ceremonial. For instance, it was about to enforce women 
Civil Servants to wear head veils. There was an instruction of  Head of  
District on congregational prayer. There were various Islamic festivities 
such as Mauled and Rajaban. I think these all were superficial. We knew 
that Muslims [ordinary people] liked to have festivities and carnivals as if  
Islamic atmosphere was great, but in fact, it had no substantive meaning. 
Nonetheless, critiques of  GM by some groups of  Islamists did 
not persist. It was because the GM had been developed, along with 
strengthened reconstruction of  Cianjur’s identity of  a Kota Santri, 
following the enactment of  the Local Autonomy policy in 2000. The 
policy did not only consist of  the delegation of  substantial authority 
from the Central Government to the Local area, but it also represented 
a growing local social-political identity. In this regard, the promotion 
of  the GM and the Kota Santri were like two sides of  the same coin. 
The local programs of  the GM were almost inseparable from attempts 
to revitalize the local identity of  the Kota Santri. The enforcement of  
the GM programs brought an imaginary state affair where retention of  
the local traditions, culture, and values associated with the Kota Santri 
were conceivable, and which thus undermined the Islamists’ perception 
of  moral degradation following the crises and ‘euphoria’ of  democracy. 
The affinity of  the GM to the Kota Santri, especially about local 
identity, had generated self-identification and indeed self-determination 
that framed the congruence of  the previously opposed Islamist groups. 
Thus it seemed there was no reason for any Islamist group in Cianjur to 
not support the GM, which had employed religious symbolism of  Islam 
which brought various groups to recognize others as brethren connected 
via commonly understood symbols, ideas, and notions38 especially in the 
era of  local autonomy. Through the GM and the reconstruction of  the 
Kota Santri, however, the people of  Cianjur drew on the long history 
38 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 2008).
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of  the region and perceived that they were somehow historically and 
culturally related. 
Also, the Islamists’ attempt to draw lines of  historical connection 
was very effective in reconstructing forms of  subjective identification 
between the people of  Cianjur. As Connor39 has suggested, subjective 
identification is indeed more powerful than a common language and 
religion in bringing people together. It is reflected in the fact that although 
Cianjur belongs to the Sunda ethnic—an ethnic sentiment originating 
in Western Java—there was also a strengthening of  Cianjur identity in 
the post-Reformasi era. It was especially so when local autonomy was 
granted to the area, which viewed Cianjur as having its own local specific 
culture and thus a claim to be unique in comparison to the Western Javan 
Sundanese in general. It provided political foundations (and justifications) 
for the local people to submit to political authority within a single 
administrative border of  Cianjur and who had refuted any attempt for 
regional diffusion (pemekaran wilayah), as commonly happened in many 
other districts and cities in Indonesia following the enactment of  Local 
Autonomy policy. Through the reproduction of  a ‘common’ identity 
of  Cianjur, the rich Northern part had withdrawn from the agenda of  
regional diffusion (pemekaran wilayah), which allowed across transferred 
budget to the less income-generating areas of  the Cianjur’s Southern part. 
This coalescence had also affected the form of  expression, 
especially among the Islamist vigilantes, to renounce violent types of  
actions. As they were working in cooperation with broader groups of  
Islamists and Islam-based organizations, and had thus been brought 
into the mainstream political system, vigilante violence was suppressed. 
Moreover, the renouncement of  vigilantism was also underpinned by 
the responsiveness of  the local office to ‘any report’ about vice and 
immoral businesses, which had appealed strongly to the vigilantes’ 
religious sentiments. Wasidi gave assurances to take action against any 
improper businesses and practices. In the meantime, he would also take 
decisive action on any group(s) that committed vigilante violence and 
used anarchic practices. As he told.
The Islamist vigilantes were always accompanied by the [National] Police 
39 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994).
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and the [Local] Civil Polices [in their action under the GM]. If  they 
practiced anarchy, we would penalize them. I said to them “if  you had 
information, for instance, about [an under-cover] nightclub, report it to 
the government, and we would ask the Civil Police to take action, together 
with you [the vigilantes]. I pulled down improper billboards, naked 
advertisements, and also alcohol-related commercials. I also penalized the 
nightclub and prostitution houses. It was because the social environment 
is an urgent matter [in developing noble morality to the people].
Wasidi’s words indicate that the decline of  violent threats was 
because the local office became responsive and took responsibility in 
dealing with vice and immoral businesses and practices. Before Wasidi’s 
administration, in a situation of  relative or, perceived, anomie, the 
Islamist vigilantes felt that they were alone in taking responsibility for 
local traditional values and morality. However, since the GM had been 
incorporated into local government policies, the vigilante type of  violent 
threats was subsumed under the common platform of  the GM led by 
the local office. This situation had led to a decline in street anarchism 
and violence. Indeed, the vigilantes began to work in cooperation with 
the police and government apparatus. 
The coalescence under the GM had also enticed the previous 
politically-excluded Islamist groups to become re-involved in more 
institutional forms of  political activism and the policy-making process. 
Prior to the reformasi of  1998 and until couple years after the Reformasi, 
there were some Islamists who refrained from political activism. However, 
the social and political developments in Cianjur, especially after 2001 
when Wasidi was elected for the Office, had enticed many Islamists to 
become involved in formal politics and democratic processes. Regarding 
deepening democracy, this tendency gave a very positive signal for future 
development especially that related to broad and substantive participation 
among diverse groups within society. Harun, a previous proponent of  
the Masyumi, stated:
In Cianjur, I was the most frequently detained-person by the police and 
military in the New Order. It was mainly because of  my preaching [that 
was not in favor of  the Regime]. I never participated in the election and 
local politics until Wasidi ran for Office. 
Wawan, a President of  the Cianjur’s PUI, had stayed away from 
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the local office and policy-making processes until Wasidi successfully 
controlled the Office in 2001. Since then, Wawan had engaged with the 
office and participated in the policy-making process. Indeed, he had 
become a member of  the Cianjur Ulama Council that worked closely 
with the executive office. Wawan explained.
I was utterly never getting in touch with the so-called Cianjur Executive 
Head until I heard about Wasidi. When he declared the GM, I and 
probably all the pesantren felt that there was a synergy between the 
goals of  pesantren and the government in amar makruf  nahyi mungkar 
[calling the right and forbidding the wrong], as if  at that time we had 
a father [Wasidi]. Since then we started to participate and give input 
to the government. Indeed, District Head used to ask for our advice/
suggestions. 
The GM had created a form of  symbolism that generated 
coalescence between the previously fragmented Islamist groups—the 
Pesantren, parties, and vigilantes—to become unified under the common 
agenda of  the GM. This was an unprecedented coalescence among the 
Islamists, which did, however, encounter problems because of  their 
inexperience in maintaining such a union between them. As a result, the 
coalescence began to erode when the Islamists faced the next election 
of  2006, where they failed to be re-elected, causing the later decline in 
shariatization in Cianjur.
D. Concluding Remarks
The growth of  shariatization in Cianjur did not necessarily 
indicate the incompatibility of  Islamists with the newly developed 
democratization. It was a manifestation of  local attempts to reinforce 
local values, norms, and morality in a temporary period of  anomie, where 
the new state was weak and perceived as unable to provide local security 
and support for the poor in the ‘post crises’ situation of  the time. Since 
Cianjur was known as a Kota Santri, it is evident that religion or religious 
teaching and values had become one of  the major sources of  reference 
for a common bounded morality in the region, and it was the symbolism 
related to this that was utilised to bring an element of  coalescence 
amongst the various plural interest groups of  Cianjur. 
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